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DUTY TO BARGAIN
the purchase was at a considerable discount because of the many
risks involved. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ignored
the fact that the discount element was a product of the risks inherent
in such a purchase and remanded to the Tax Court to determine
what portion of the gain was attributable to interest income in the
nature of "issue discount." 9 The Tax Court determined that the
purchaser had received a six percent interest discount that would
be taxable as ordinary income. The result gives the commissioner
authority for asserting that in all discount purchases there is an
imputed interest element which will not qualify for capital gains
treatment. Such a theory would appear to be erroneous because it
transposes the imputed interest factor from the deferred payment
sales context"0 into the entirely distinct discount purchase context.
Further, it results in the denial of capital gain treatment to the
normal appreciation of an admitted capital asset due to market
factors, and ignores the fact that the condemnation in Midland-Ross
resulted because that discount was the economic equivalent of
interest.
R. WALTON M CNAIRY, JR.
Labor Law-Effect of 9(c)3 on Duty to Bargain
The Labor Management Relations Act, section 9(c)3, prohibits
holding a representation election in a bargaining unit "within which
in the preceding twelve-month period, a valid election shall have been
held."' The issue in Conren, Inc. v. NLRB2 was whether this
prohibition prevents enforcement of an order to bargain issued
because of the employer's refusal, nine and one-half months after the
union had lost an election, to grant recognition on the basis of
authorization cards signed by a majority of his employees.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit enforced the
NLRB's order to bargain, with Circuit Judge Kiley dissenting.
The majority reasoned that the affirmative reference to "election"
in 9(c)3 should not be construed to preclude representation based
" Jones v. Commissioner, 330 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1964).
" Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 483.
' 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)3 (1964).2368 F.2d 173 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 35 U.S.L. Week 3330 (U.S.
Mar. 21, 1967).
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upon a majority showing achieved by means less formal than an
election. The absence, in 9(c)3, of any reference to less formal
means, such as authorization cards, was construed as an express
exclusion of such means. The court asserted that to hold otherwise
would "usurp a legislative prerogative."'
The legislative history of 9(c)3 can hardly be construed to sup-
port the majority view. Before enactment of the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act, the NLRB had evolved a "reasonable time rule"
that protected a union's certified status, usually for one year, after
it had won an election.' Even while the NLRB was following this
"reasonable time rule" one authority5 argued that the policy of the
act, to encourage "the practice and procedure of collective bargain-
ing and . . . [to protect] the exercise by workers of full freedom of
association,"" could best be achieved through a period of stability
following an election. He analogized a representation election to
any election in our society in which the results are final:
Similar considerations would seem to require that once a bargain-
ing representative has been duly designated, that designation,
except in extraordinary circumstances, must, in the interest of
stability, remain operative for a reasonable period of time and
cannot be revoked at every whimsy of the electorate. . . . The
price of freedom to bargain collectively is responsibility in the
exercise of the freedom of choice.
7
In 9 (c) 3 Congress codified the administratively evolved doctrine
of the "reasonable time rule" and applied it also to situations in
which a union had lost an election. The majority report of the
bill explained the change this "election bar" would make:
This amendment [9(c)3] prevents the board from holding elec-
tions more often than once a year .... At present, if the union
loses, it may on the presentation of additional membership cards
81Id. at 174.
'See Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 98 (1954), in which Justice
Frankfurter discusses Board practice before enactment of the Taft-Hartley
Act.
Bernard Cushman was serving as Chief of the Legislative and Bureau
Services Section of the Solicitor's Office, Department of Labor, when he
wrote the article cited.
'National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935),
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1964).
Cushman, The Duration of Certifications by the NLRB and the Doc-




secure another election within a short time, but if it wins its
majority cannot be challenged for a year.8
In the absence of any clarifying debate, the inference that Con-
gress intended this "election bar" to include less formal means of
gaining recognition after an election had been lost seems at least
as justified as the majority's inference that Congress intended to
exclude such means.' The "industrial stability" which Congress
sought to insure by enactment of 9(c)31" is considerably weakened
if the "election bar" is interpreted as not precluding less formal
means of achieving representation rights.
An election results in either formal designation of a bargaining
agent or formal repudiation of any representation. The issue in
Conren was whether informal designation of a bargaining agent
will be allowed in situations where formal designation by election
is not permitted. No other case has considered this question. De-
cisions of federal courts and the NLRB, however, have ruled that
the act prevents informal repudiation of a union majority within
a year after formal designation.1 An election victory for a union
compels the employer to bargain with the certified union even after
he receives notice that a majority of his employees no longer wish
to be represented by the union. The Supreme Court held, in Brooks
v. NLRB,'2 that this result was necessary because:
8 S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1947). Senator Taft com-
mented on this provision, 9(c)3, stating: "The bill also provides that elec-
tions shall be held only once a year so that there shall not be a constant stir-
ring up of excitement by continual elections." 93 CoNG. REc. 3838 (1947).
The Senate amendment was adopted by the conference committee in lieu
of the House amendment which would have allowed a decertification elec-
tion inside of a year upon petition by employees. 93 CONG. REc. 6375 (1947)
(report of conference committee).
'What is today known as the Joy Silk doctrine, an order to bargain with-
out election upon showing of majority support, had been judicially recog-
nized by Judge Learned Hand in NLRB v. Federbush Co., 121 F.2d 954,
956 (2d Cir. 1941). It is therefore just as reasonable to assume that Senator
Taft knew of this situation and intended to include it as to assume he either
did not know of the decision or else intended to exclude it.
"0 See Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 103 (1954) (underlying purpose
of statute is industrial peace); Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co. v. NLRB, 338
U.S. 355, 362 (1949) (stability of labor relations was primarily objective
of Congress); NLRB v. Holly-General Co., 305 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1962).
"See Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96 (1954); NLRB v. Holly-General
Co., 305 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1962); Montgomery Ward & Co., 162 N.L.R.B.
No. 27 (1966).
"2348 U.S. 96 (1954).
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Congress has discarded common-law doctrines of agency. It is
contended that since a bargaining agency may be ascertained by
methods less formal than a supervised election, informal repudia-
tion should also be sanctioned where decertification by another
election is precluded. This is to make situations that are dif-
ferent appear the same.' 3
The Supreme Court, finding in the act a policy of industrial sta-
bility, refused to sanction informal procedures, within a year after
an election, that were designed to determine a union's representa-
tion rights. Thus it would appear that Judge Kiley's contention
that "the converse of the holding in Brooks ought to control this
decision [Conren]" is correct. 4
The most persuasive ground for Judge Kiley's dissent in Conren
was the "congressional purpose of the act... and... the spirit of
the developing statutory law."' 5 Relying on Brooks, he pointed out
that the concept of industrial stability was the guiding principle
behind the one-year spacing of elections enacted by 9(c)3 and that
solicitation of cards within a year of the valid election "is as dis-
ruptive of industrial peace as a second election."'"
A second ground for dissent involved consideration of the re-
liability of informal means in determining a union's majority status.
Reviewing several cases, Judge Kiley concluded that the policy of
the NLRB and the courts was to accept only the most reliable
means "in order to insure the employees' freedom of choice."'
17
Since the union has lost a valid election within a year, the less
reliable showing of majority status by authorization cards should
preclude charging Conren with an 8(a) 5' violation.
The dissenting opinion implies that recognition of such informal
2
1 Id. at 103, 104. The Court also discussed the policy behind the
"election bar" including responsibility of the electorate, renunciation of
choice by a procedure equally as solemn as the first, and minimization of
strife. Id. at 99, 100.
' Conren, Inc. v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 173, 177 (7th Cir. 1966) (dissenting
opinion). In NLRB v. Holly-General Co., 305 F.2d 670, 675 (9th Cir. 1962),
the court enumerated three reasons for following Brooks when a union had
been informally repudiated eleven months after an election: (1) stability
in labor-management relations, (2) ease in enforcement by the Board, and
(3) clear delineation of the time for good faith bargaining.
15 368 F.2d at 175.
"Old. at 177.
17 Id. at 176.
18 "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer . . . to refuse
to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees . . . . 49
Stat. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)5 (1964).
[Vol. 45
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means would be an unwarranted extension of the Joy Silk-"no
good faith doubt"-rule. The NLRB applies this rule when issuing
an order to bargain19 after a union has acquired a majority of
authorization cards and made a demand to bargain upon an em-
ployer who refuses to bargain but has no good faith doubt that the
union represents a majority of his employees.20 Judge Kiley felt that
an employer, regardless of the prohibition in 9(c)3, could indeed
have a good faith doubt about a union's majority status within a
year after a formal election. Judge Kiley might also have related this
policy of accepting only the most reliable determination of a union's
status to his argument for industrial stability, the purpose the courts
have found in the act.
Congress in 9(c)3 barred any election for a period of one year
after a valid election. Since this most formal means of establishing
a bargaining relationship has been precluded by affirmative Con-
gressional action, it would seem illogical to assert that a less formal
and less reliable"' means of establishing a bargaining relationship
should be allowed to subvert the policy of industrial stability fos-
tered by the act. This seems to be the gist of the Supreme Court's
opinion in Brooks. Such reasoning is implicit, though not articu-
lated, in Judge Kiley's dissent.
Since common-law doctrines of agency have been abolished,22
and Congress has clearly made labor-management relations a matter
"0The Labor Management Relation Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 9(c) 1,
61 Stat. 144 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)1 (1964), provides the only means
for certification, an election. An order to bargain is not certification and
the period of time that an employer must bargain in good faith after such
an order is in the Board's discretion. See NLRB v. Pool Mfg. Co., 339
U.S. 577 (1950); NLRB v. Mexia Textile Mills, 339 U.S. 563 (1950).
20In Snow & Sons, 134 N.L.R.B. 709, 710 (1961), enforced, 308 F.2d
687 (9th Cir. 1962), the NLRB stated that "the right of an Employer to
insist upon a Board-directed election is not absolute." Furthermore, "where
the employer's unfair labor practices are dearly established . . . the good
faith of his doubts of the union majority may properly be regarded with
some suspicion." NLRB v. Cumberland Shoe Corp., 351 F.2d 917, 921
(6th Cir. 1965).
2 See Comment, Union Anthorization Cards, 75 YALE L.J. 805 (1966).
"Authorization cards are an unreliable index of employee choice. Com-
pared with the secret ballot they replace, their solicitation is a woefully
defective process . . . ." Id. at 818. See also NLRB v. Johnnie's Poultry
Co., 344 F.2d 617 (8th Cir. 1965), in which a union received twenty-
seven votes after acquiring fifty-five cards. More than a year later when
the union again sought to bargain with the employer, the Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit reversed a NLRB order to bargain holding that
employer had a good faith doubt as to the union's majority status.
" See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
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of federal policy, an analogy to elections in a political context is
valid. Employees' freedom of choice exercised in a formal election
should be binding, short of an unusual circumstance, until another
election is possible. Congress has sought to establish a period of
stability after an election. This formality of an election is meaning-
less if the NLRB can, within one year after an election, disrupt the
stability by issuing orders to bargain, based upon showings of ma-
jority status attained through informal means. Stability in labor-
management relations can best be achieved within a context of cer-
tainty. Decisions such as Brooks make this certainty mandatory
when an election results in victory for a bargaining agent. To
apply a different rule when a certified election results in defeat of a
union is arbitrary and unfair.
GEORGE CARSON II
Labor Law-'Outsiders' As Agents of the Employer
Any coercive, antiunion activities by persons acting as agents
of an employer covered by the Labor Management Relations Act
will be imputed to him and the union concerned will have a remedy
before the National Labor Relations Board.2 However, those
persons found not to be agents are beyond the reach of the law
and consequently are free to continue at will their antiunion ac-
tivities. Thus, an important aspect of labor legislation is the con-
cept of agency, as it will often determine employer responsibilities.
Under the original provision of the Wagner Act of 1935,' the
term "employer" included "any person acting in the interests of an
employer, directly or indirectly. . . .' Using this language of the
act, the NLRB imputed to employers the actions of third parties,
even those only remotely connected with the employer.5 This was
Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 2(2), 61 Stat.
137 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1965).
2 Hereinafter referred to as NLRB.
'Act of July 5, 1935, § 2(2), 49 Stat. 450.
'Act of July 5, 1935, § 2(2), 49 Stat. 450.
H.R. REP. No. 244, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 18 (1947). The committee
report said:
The Board frequently "imputed" to employers anything that anyone
connected with an employer, no matter how remotely, said or did,
notwithstanding that the employer had not authorized the action and
in many cases had even prohibited it.
Ibid.
[Vol. 45
